

Installing a Secure Linux Server

Linux Server Hardening Techniques Shachar Shemesh http://www.shemesh.biz

Why Harden a Server



- Need to remotely manage a server.
 - SSH is the best solution
- Need to keep the server's clock synchronized
 - NTP is the best solution
- Both SSH and NTP has had serious vulnerabilities in the past!
- Conclusion we must trust the services we run as little as possible.

The Hardening Process



- Create layers of isolated services
- Minimize points of exposure
- Limit daemons' permissions to the bare minimum
- Set up mechanisms to alert about violations
- Make each breach harder

Minimize Points of Exposure



- Disable all unnecessary services
- Firewall rules to block access
 - Use TCP wrappers, such as *tcpd*
- Uninstall unnecessary software
 - Better yet start with nothing installed, only install neccessary stuff
- Separate each daemon from the others
 - Permissions
 - File access

Privilege Separation



- In the past, all daemons ran as user "nobody".
 - "nobody" became the second most powerful user in the system.
- Today, nobody uses "nobody".
 Instead, each service has its own, unique, user.



- Only "root" can bind to low (<1024) ports.
- Bind needs to run as user "named", and listen on port 53.
 - Inherent dropping privileges
 - Daemon's code binds to port 53 as "root", and then drops the priveleges.
 - Can do so permenantly or temporarily
 - External port binding
 - A wrapper (inetd) binds to the low port, and drops priveleges before running the daemon.

Change Root Jails



- Once a non-priveleged service has been compromised, attacker will seek escalation.
 - Local vulnerabilities
- Often relies on uncareful local configs.
- Vulnerable SUID executables
 - Another reason to have as little as possible installed

Change Root Jail (cont.)



- A subdir becomes the root (jail)
- Process cannot access files outside jail.
 - All files required for actual running must be inside the jail already.
- Some daemons have builtin support
 - Very easy to set up
 - Usually doesn't require imports
- Others don't
 - chroot before running
 - daemon's executable must be in jail

chroot Helper Tools



- Idd analyzes a program's dynamic dependencies
- In create a link between files
 - Symbolic resolved on use cannot link to files outside the jail.
 - Hard Cannot link files on different filesystems.
 - Will usually use symlinks into the jail.
- Debian only makejail

chroot Challenges



- Binary packages install outside the jail.
 - Debian's "makejail" goes a long way torwards a solution.
- Different daemons may require the same data
 - mount -bind *olddir newdir* (≥2.4.x)
 - mount -rbind *olddir newdir* (≥2.4.x)
 - mount -move olddir newdir (≥2.5.1)
 - 2.6 is unreleased yet.

The Ultimate Jail – Virtual MachinelsraeLinux

- "User Mode Linux", or "UML"
 - The daemon process runs on an entirely different kernel.
 - Not emulation no significant performance penalty

Security Patched Kernels



- OWL openwall.com
 - Nonexecutable stack, early patching
- GRSecurity grsecurity.net
 - OWL's nonexec stack, proc fs restrictions, some ACL support, many other enhancements.
- LSM Ism.immunix.org
 - Allows per-syscall permissions hook
 - Infrastructure plugins "sold" separately.