#### Format String Dangers

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#### Schedule

- Reintroduction to printf (as if you don't already know...).
- Some reflection about common uses of printf.
- Dangers of letting attackers supply format strings.
- Step by step demonstration of exploit.

#### **Printf manual**

PRINTF(3)

#### Linux Programmer's Manual

PRINTF(3)

NAME

printf, fprintf, sprintf, snprintf, vprintf, vfprintf, vsprintf, vsprintf, vsprintf, vsprintf - formatted output conversion

SYNOPSIS #include <stdio.h>

> int printf(const char \*format, ...); int fprintf(FILE \*stream, const char \*format, ...); int sprintf(char \*str, const char \*format, ...); int snprintf(char \*str, size\_t size, const char \*format, ...);

#### The Format String

- Most characters are simply echoed.
- A "%" indicates a special field (unless followed by another "%").
- It is up to the programmer to make sure the parameters number and type match the format string.
  - Some compilers will verify this for static format strings.

#### **Format String Functions**

(v)printf
(v)sprintf
(v)snprintf
(v)fprintf
syslog


(v)wprintf
(v)fwprintf
(v)swprintf
(v)dprintf
(v)asprintf

#### **Caveat Emptor**

- sysinfo hasn't got the telltale "printf" word in it.
  - It is all too easy to mistake it for accepting a plain string.
- Accepting a format string is all too common with error functions.
  - An error is usually a situation triggerable by an attacker.
- Projects usually have similar, private, functions.

## How Format Strings Work

printf("Hello %s, it's been %d days since your last login\n", username, days);



# When Format String and Parameters Mismatch

printf( buffer );

What if "buffer" is "%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%x??

When the pointer is here the attacker controls both parameter and interpretation return address

frame pointer

 $X^0/_0X^0/_0X^0/_0X^0/_0X$ 

%x%x%x%x%x%x%x%

format string ptr

printf return addr.

#### What Can be Done?

Query parameters from the stack • %x, %d etc. Query data from anywhere in the program %s when the pointer is inside the buffer to get info from anywhere. Passwords, private keys..... Crash the program %s from non-readable memory. % f wich requires to devide by zero.



The ratio between the pointer advance and the characters it take. Determines how far up from our buffer we can peek. %x gives 1:2 %f gives 1:4, but risks devide by zero. # what does "printf("%3\$d %2\$d %1\$d",5,6,7);" print?

# A user supply format string gives the atocker a read only debugger access into the application! DI

## %n – The Little Option Noobody Knows

- %n writes into the int pointed to by the respective argument the number of characters printed so far.
- An attacker can choose to write (%n), where to write (supply a pointer).
- By playing with field length, can also control what to write.
- Bare shortcuts, that may require printing an average of 2GB of data.

#### Some of the Shortcuts

 Write four times to addresses increasing by 1 each time.

Will only work on platform that don't enforce integral boundries (e.g. - Intel).

Use %hn to write to short.

Now only requires printing 64K.

Use %hhn to write to byte.

Only prints 256 bytes.

#### A Few Bad Habits or – you won't believe what people do!

- The following code samples represent errors found (not necessarily by me) in shipping code (some commercial, some free).
- The exact code was modified to protect paying customers the innocent.

#### A Few Bad Habits

#define ASSERT(cond, err) \
 if(!(cond)) { \
 printf(err); exit(100); }

What will the following imagenary code do?

ASSERT (progress>10, "Couldn't pass 10% mark" );

#### Pointless use

/\* Initialize title \*/ sprintf( title, "About to copy files" ); 'sprintf' scans the format string for fields. Unofficial benchmark shows 50% performance of 'sprintf(buff, data)' over 'sprintf(buff, "%s", data)'. Using 'strcpy' or 'strncpy' would be much better in this case.

#### **Dangerous** Pitfall

int logerr( char \*fmt, ... )

```
va_list args;
char buff[1024];
```

va\_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buff, sizeof(buff), fmt, args ); va end(args);

return fprintf(errlog, buff);



#### #include <stdio.h>

> "The C Programming Language", Second Edition Brian W. Kernighan Dennis M. Ritchie Prentice Hall Software Series, 1988